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A New Cosmology of Risks and Crises: 
Time for a Radical Shift in Paradigm and Practice 
Dr. Patrick Lagadec1 
 
 
“Our current system for homeland security 
does not provide the necessary framework to manage the challenges 
posed by 21st-Century catastrophic threats.” 
The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina – Lessons Learned 
The White House, 23 February 2006 [p. 52] 
 
 
Crises in the 21st century differ—structurally— from those we had to deal with in the last 
century. Those were traditionally defined and handled as a combination of “threat, urgency 
and uncertainty”. Today, they are better described in terms ofa destruction of vital references 
and a dynamic of systemic implosions. If crises were a type of severe, dynamic accident , they 
are becoming the essential mode of life of our hypercomplex systems. These transboundary 
crises mark awatershed between mindsets and tools of the past, and the new strategic 
landscape which we are now in. The intellectual and governance challenges are extreme. But 
looking backwards is not an option. It is vital to forge new routes into Terrae Incognitae. The 
goal of this article is to help build a) a renewed understanding of the emerging challenges we 
face; b) a better strategic response to these systemic dislocations which are now the name of 
the game.   
 
Introduction 
When Magellan decided to launch his circumnavigation of the globe, and confront unknown 
conditions and risks, he knew a few things: the cosmology of the time, based on calculations 
and theories of the ancient Greek and Egyptian mathematicians and astronomers, was 
inadequate and misleading; the “best practices”, fitted for the Mediterranean sea, would 
certainly prove to be dangerous traps; he would have to break time-honored assumptions –
and, last but not least, confront the backlash of such a blasphemous disruption of accepted 
theory (Bergreen, 2004, p. 10). 
This example is a lesson for all seasons, but especially for the 21st Century. When the 
world mutates (OECD, 2003), ruling theories and best practices become outmoded, and turn 
into lethal pitfalls. The inescapable challenge is to rethink the issues, not to open additional 
boxes fitting the same models. The first enemy are the barriers in our minds. Our cherished 
models, those that have been so meticulously built in the last decades, are increasingly less 
relevant as new horizons of risks and crises unfold (Quarantelli, Lagadec, Boin, 2006; 
Lagadec, P., 2006, 2007). The words of Sunzi contain as a dreadful warning: “If you know 
neither the risks nor yourself, you are bound to be defeated in every battle” (Sunzi, 1999). 
“Never fight the last war [crisis]” is the motto of the new game (Granatt, 2004). 
The goal of this article is to set the scene for a new understanding and handling of today’s 
hypercomplex issues. The point is not to find “the right script”, “the right answer”, but to 
sketch out the maps that could help to muddle through uncharted waters. The point is not to 
provide plans and tools to avoid surprise – but to prepare to be surprised (LaPorte, T. R., 
2007a). We have been entirely focused on finding answers, now we must shift to the 
questions –and invent new intelligence, attitude, and practice for a chaotic world (Lagadec, 
E., 2007; Cabinet Office, 2008).  
                                         
1 Ecole Polytechnique,  plagadec@club-internet.fr ; www.patricklagadec.net 
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A Whole New Ball Game 
For decades, we have developed and consolidated a science of risk that was embedded in a 
strong and rewarding Cartesian philosophy. Identification, isolation, measurement, statistics, 
lessons of the past, best practices, ready-made effective responses in case of incident. More 
recently, “knowledge” has emerged in the field of crisis management with regard to 
surveillance, alerts, mobilization, crisis team, crisis center, crisis plans, crisis communication, 
mitigation and recovery, crisis drills. For serious events, a “more of the same” logic was 
applied: more detailed plans, more powerful tools, more coordination, and often more 
centralization. This vision is now outdated, to a large extent. The problem we face is that 
crises have evolved past the bounds of compartmentalized emergency into the vastness of 
unstable and chaotic Terrae Incognitae. 
 
Risks and crises in the wilderness of the unknown 
This “remarkable story of risk” (Bernstein, 1996) can be considered a victory “against the 
Gods” or Nature. By developing an ability to isolate the facts, recognizing the regularity of 
some events, and through an enhanced sense of apprehension and calculations, human beings 
and societies increasingly succeeded in controlling the flow of events. This control opened the 
way to great discoveries and achievements, with more and more sophisticated techniques to 
tame risks and vulnerabilities. However, a series of intertwined dimensions of today’s risks 
compel us to revisit these paradigms.  
Scale.  Our whole philosophy of risk and crisis is that the event is clearly specific, isolated, 
independent, and above all very limited compared to the size of the systems affected. Extreme 
events no longer fit into that model. 
The network factor.  The intricacy of the vital infrastructures on which we are increasingly 
dependent at the national and international levels can act as a resonance chamber that will 
magnify a local breakdown to unprecedented proportions (Auerswald, Brancomb, LaPorte 
and Michel-Kerjan, 2006; Boin and McConnel, 2007; Boin, Lagadec, Michel-Kerjan, 
Overdijk, 2003). On 14 August 2003, a small power fluctuation mishandled in Ohio resulted 
in a major power blackout effecting millions in the northeastern US and Ontario Canada. 
Europe was not far from such a massive black-out in November 2006.   
Speed. The SARS episode in 2003 showed the need to think of our vulnerabilities in the 
context of highly compressed time units. The combination of the virus and the jet airliner 
changed the rules: in just a few hours, the virus jumped from Hong Kong to Toronto: a single, 
symptom-free carrier was enough to shake the capital of Ontario (which lost 15,000 jobs). 
The 14 August 2003 power cut plunged the northeastern part of North America into darkness 
in less than a minute (US Canada Task Force, 2004). Today, an electronic glitch could shut 
down our information systems worldwide within a minute (Cukier, 2005). When we realize 
that it takes a good 10 days to get our systems up and running in case of a freak event 
(Katrina, heat waves, tsunami), this time discrepancy is a cause for concern. 
Ignorance.  We now often find ourselves moving from uncertainty, a dimension to which 
we are well accustomed, to ignorance. The issue is not totally new, but increasingly 
challenging, on all fronts (LaPorte, 1994). Not only do experts now find themselves at the 
very limits of the current state of knowledge, but their theories and plans are simply not 
working. The problem is no longer to identify what we “still” don't know,  but more modestly 
to try to discern what parcel of our available knowledge really is robust enough to answer the 
surge of questioning from all sides that modern crises elicit, and to guide us through them 
when all else fails. It was the key challenge with the mad cow threat (Phillips of Worth 
Matravers, Bridgeman, Ferguson-Smith, 2000), when stakeholders were thrust into a 
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maelstrom of contradictory information, between concerns that there might be “millions” of 
victims, official pronouncements that the disease was harmless, and the eventual, reassuring 
scientific assessments in hindsight, which allowed many to regain their bearings by simply 
shrugging off the entire episode as much ado about nothing. In August 2003, in Europe, many 
officials thought it best to shrug their shoulders again over a bit of summer heat, until, over a 
period of 10 days, the toll mounted to a staggering 70,000 deaths (Lagadec, 2004).  
Hypercomplexity. Our modes of acting are configured according to “normal” benchmarks 
of complexity, meaning that a typical emergent event can be neatly classified within a 
relatively defined and stable context. Now, these benchmarks have been abruptly 
overwhelmed.  This was the case with Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005. Katrina caused 
persistent flooding, a series of industrial disasters, critical evacuation challenges, widespread 
pollution, the destruction of 90% of the essential utility networks (energy, communications, 
water etc.), unprecedented public safety concerns, concern over the possible loss of the port 
area (which is essential to the continent's economy), even uncertainty as to whether portions 
of the city could be saved.  
The inconceivable.  This is potentially the most destabilizing element of all.  America was 
prepared for missiles, but it was hit with box cutters, and its own commercial planes, coming 
from US airports, (initially) under the helm of American pilots.  We thought global epidemics 
were a thing of the past, and, lo and behold, the specter of a pandemic has returned. Indeed, 
when we look back at the flu pandemic of 1918 (Barry, 2004), we even have to acknowledge 
that societies of that time were probably a good deal more resilient than ours, trapped as we 
are by the widespread devotion to “lean” processes and “just-in-time” principles that can 
transform a minor breakdown into a cascading domino-disaster almost instantly. What would 
it mean today to lose a major urban centre, a hub city? 
 “Category-5 media storms.  Yesterday's question was whether and how our crisis 
managers, the exclusive recipients of warnings, analyses, and recommendations from the 
experts, would pass on information to the media with sufficient transparency and 
understanding.  The challenge for them today is how to cope when all tools of governance and 
“top-down” logics are promptly outflanked by unbelievably powerful mass-media systems 
that are so adept at “staging” events, and have acquired their own “situation rooms”.  Another 
front also has been opened with the Internet, blogs and vlogs. Instantly, myriads of sources 
are brought to bear on a situation. These in turn cause mutations that must be managed. For 
example, during 7/7 in London (Home Office, 2006), whoever could not instantly reach 
someone in London thought the non-answering person was among the victims (Granatt, 
Lagadec, 2005). 
In other words, the “good old” crises of the 1980s and 1990s, with their confined stage and 
still relatively simple rules, are undergoing mutations. That leap was in fact the crux of the 
Katrina challenge and fiasco. As Admiral Thad Allen put it: “When I arrived in Louisiana 
some 10 days after the landing of Katrina, the essential characterization of the problem had 
not been done, people were dealing with a “common Hurricane”, but it was not. It was a 
weapon of mass destruction without criminal dimension” (Allen, 2008). We are experiencing 
exactly the same fault line with the “financial crisis”, which is not a financial hurricane but a 
global upheaval of the entire social-economic system.  
 
A global context prone to liquefaction 
A fundamental approach to risk has been “the breach in the dike” strategy. We are 
discovering that the “dikes” themselves are subject to in-depth “liquefaction” or destruction. 
Any blow can trigger extravagant domino effects, global contaminations, reactions, and 
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mutations. Multiple and interdependent structural fault-lines increasingly appear as the 
decisive dimension of emerging crises. 
Demography and Urbanization. The next half-century will see an increase of more than 3 
billion people on earth, bringing the figure to 9.3 billion by 2050 (OECD, 2003). The increase 
will especially affect poor countries, coastlines and deltas – areas prone to major natural 
hazards. The ageing of populations will transform the risk maps in the most developed 
countries. The incredible growth of mega-cities will produce totally new problems and issues, 
with major challenges such as poverty, environment, insecurity, transportation bottlenecks, 
and ever less resilience.  
Environment and Public Health.  Water scarcity and pollution, soil loss through wind and 
water erosion, air pollution, sudden climate change can all produce major intercontinental and 
worldwide imbalances. To this we must add the impact of technological developments that 
are largely unpredictable but that will be both specific and systemic in nature such as 
electromagnetic radiation, bio- and nanotechnology, installations reaching the end of their life 
cycle, and wastes of all kinds. The fields to consider are innumerable, some of which will be 
completely foreign to our benchmarks and our experience. 
A “tightly-coupled” civilization. In the 1980s, we began to consider the risks of "tightly 
coupled" systems (Perrow, 1984, 2007). What we now have is not only a coupling of critical 
technical systems, but a civilization based essentially on interlinkages that are generalized, 
dynamic, and largely invisible, even to the operators most directly concerned. The global 
economy depends on this structural fragility. The question of vulnerability, then, in fact no 
longer is a problem of risk affecting a sensitive point but a structural problem, one that is 
intimately linked to the very way our systems function.  
Geostrategy, Violence. Globalization opens innumerable fault lines between people who, 
in the past, had been somewhat isolated from each other. All the factors discussed in this 
article have become potential factors for mass destruction. "The network is the weapon", as 
was demonstrated (to a limited extent) in the case of postal services hit by the 2001 anthrax 
attacks and hoaxes (Lagadec, Michel-Kerjan, 2006). 
Economy. The past year has been the most challenging example of the global tendency to 
glide from a crisis to a meltdown – from the “subprime crisis” to the financial, and now 
economic-social meltdown. The issue is no longer this or that “accident”, or even “disaster”, 
but the perspective of global dislocations overwhelming our theories, best practices, models 
and sense-making capabilities. 
Due to the combination of “barbarous” events and “chaotic” contexts, both open to 
discontinuity, and even ignorance, alarming qualifications that analysts of risks used to 
dismiss now no longer appear quite so remote and secondary, but major and central. It was 
Leibnitz’s admonition in 1703: “Nature has established patterns originating in the return of 
events, but only for the most part” (Bernstein, 1996, p. 4). It was Cardano (16h Century) who 
in his mathematical analysis of the probabilities in dice-throwing carefully qualified his 
results with “…if the die is honest” (idem, p.45). The crucial part of risk, and crises, 
increasingly lies in such blind spots, where we do not have the ready-made tools, where our 
best mathematical techniques no longer apply. When the map is lost, the best specific 
solutions vanish. The issue is not such or such point of uncertainty, but rather a global and 
systemic descent into this unintelligible world of the chaotic: one in which notions like 
“discontinuity” and the “inconceivable” become watchwords. Averages, statistical 
regularities, and the lessons of history are no longer pertinent points of reference.  The 
atypical, the singular, the exceptional become the order of the day.  And when the pace, the 
scope and the nature of the terrain thus depart so abruptly from accepted blueprints, our 
visions, our initiatives and our tools rapidly fall apart. We must rebuild them, and do so 
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urgently. This we can only achieve if we adopt a very bold attitude, which is precisely the 
scientific attitude: “Be prepared to give up every preconceived notion” (Barry, 2004, p. 13).  
 
TAMED RISKS and CRISES 
 
Context:  
A Stable World + Rare Disturbing Events 
 
Events:  
Specific, Known, Controlled 
 
Policy:  
Best Answers, Best Plans, Best Tools 
 
Mindset:  
Continuity, Average, Control 
 
Training:  
Learning Best Fixed Answers   
 
Education:  
Math, Quantitative Tools, Top-Down Ready 
Managers 
 
Psychology:  
Vitally Protected by Known Rules 
 
Institutional Selection:  
Efficiency to apply the Rules 
 
Ultimate Institutional Responsibility: 
Known Events Management, Through Existing 
Rules and Laws 
 
Danger:  
Maginot Line Mentality 
 
WILDERNESS OF THE UNKNOWN 
 
Context:  
Unstable Foundations + Domino Events 
 
Events:  
Global, Unknown, Beyond Control 
 
Policy:  
Best Questions, Reinvent Trajectories  
 
Mindset:  
Discontinuity, Extreme, Chaotic 
 
Training:  
Learning to Be Surprised (LaPorte)   
 
Education:  
Facing the Unknown, with Others (Multidisciplinary)  
 
 
Psychology:  
Open to Terrae Incognitae 
 
Institutional Selection:  
Double ability: Within and Beyond the Rules 
 
Ultimate Institutional Responsibility: 
Addressing the Vital Issues, even if it means Reinventing 
the Rules 
 
Danger: 
Irresponsible Actions  
 
Facing the unknown: inventing new cognitive and managerial maps 
 “Why do we continually seem one disaster behind?” Those words of the US House of 
Representatives in their report on Katrina (US House of Representatives, 2006, p. 359) apply 
to any country.  For all our efforts at catching up, our notions of crisis management still are 
legacies of an obsolete set of paradigms, namely: “an accident, an answer; a larger accident, a 
larger answer”. We will not genuinely move forward if we fail to replace this mindset with its 
opposite: “no ready-made answer can be the solution to modern crises”. Emerging crises call 
for other paradigms and other strategies.  In what follows, we identify a few landmarks to 
open the way.   
  
A new culture of signal detection 
A simple emergency requires that the specific agency responsible has the capacity to react 
automatically to a clear and specific warning and to feed it promptly into the normal channels. 
A “conventional” crisis calls for the capacity to process signals that may be weak or scattered.  
Emerging crises demand something else: the ability to spot the signs of phenomena that 
cannot be represented by any known model.  In that case, the alert cannot be given 
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automatically (as in an emergency) or largely pre-formatted (as in a known crisis), using pre-
established principles.  
The first obstacle is obvious: we have to capture a phenomenon not previously identified.  
We do not have a set of boxes to be filled in, nor any accurate indications of what we should 
or might detect. More than "weak signals", we need to look for signals that, by their nature, 
are virtually silent and especially elusive for the screening systems at hand.  
This type of surveillance encounters a second obstacle: as soon as they are detected, or 
even suspected, the signals will trigger the vague sensation of a major threat to the system, 
which in turn triggers an irrepressible and instantaneous need to delete and avoid.  It is as if 
the signal carries within itself the ability to neutralize the receptors, and block activation of 
the alert mechanism and the transmission chains, and indeed any idea or inclination for 
mobilization and reaction. That is why, in their post-crisis reports, investigators have 
consistently declared their "consternation" upon realizing, after the fact, how many players 
had been deaf and blind to the event in question.  
If non-conventional surveillance is to be possible, it must be entrusted basically to persons 
and systems with the appropriate form of intelligence. Not the “procedural intelligence”, ideal 
for repetitive phenomena. Not even “intuitive” intelligence, when we have to work with just 
20% of the necessary information. But “creative intelligence” which demands (and rewards) 
imagination, well beyond any given set of guidelines; and, more: people who feel comfortable 
and creative in a destabilized world, where the dice have not yet been rolled. Generally those 
people have been pushed aside by our institutions.  
And then: even if “strange” (not “weak”) signals have been detected, how are they taken 
into account at higher levels? The whistle blower must be able to mobilize the leadership, 
which constitutes a second barrier, since straying outside regular, risk-free pathways is always 
perceived as extremely dangerous at the highest levels.  
 
Leadership 
“At all levels of government, we must build a leadership corps populated by leaders who are 
prepared to exhibit innovation and take the initiative during extremely trying circumstances”  
(The White House, 2006, p. 72). Such leaders ought to be able to take “inconvenient” signals 
and disconcerting realities fully on board — yet people in charge have been selected for their 
managerial skills: the ability to run conventional things according to the best given practices. 
Emerging crises demand leaders: questions of vision and policy come to the fore.  This calls 
for in-depth education to the unknown, specific training to confront these universes, and 
above all the personal capacity to be involved even when there is no ready-made, MBA-
certified solution.  
Leaders have to break through the conventional limits, to slip across old boundaries and 
invent new collective responses. When vital issues are at stake, nothing can be done without 
determined personal and direct involvement from the top.  As Henry Kissinger (1982: 531) 
put it, “The most important role of a leader is to take on his shoulders the burden of ambiguity 
inherent in difficult choices. That accomplished, his subordinates have criteria and can turn to 
implementation.” 
This constitutes a revolution in our culture of governance, which would rather leave it to 
the second ranks to anticipate risks and take charge in situations that are not yet clear.  There 
is a tendency, in effect, to try to "protect" the leader, as long as everything is not “perfectly 
clear”. 
Here too, one might argue that some cultures are better prepared than others. The US could 
be seen as more amenable to the type of leadership advocated here. An especially striking 
example here is that of Rudolph Giuliani, the Mayor of New York City at the time of the 
September 11 events. His role is easily underlined if one compares the response in New York 
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and what occurred in New Orleans in 2005 (even if the two situations were very different in 
many respects). His convictions and his personal commitment on the front line of that 
inconceivable event were the cornerstone of the city’s resilience. His advice is unambiguous: 
“Have beliefs and communicate them. See things for yourself. Set an example. Prepare 
relentlessly. Underpromise and overdeliver. Don’t assume a damn thing” (Giuliani, 2002, p. 
x).   
 
Leaders must be mentally prepared to adopt an approach to intelligence and action that is 
more creative than procedural. With very little information available and even less of it 
verified, the leader must have the conviction and the vision to lead the community out of its 
initial disorientation, and to avoid the two pitfalls that are always present in extreme crises: 
bureaucratic inertia (where each organization waits till the crisis fits its codes and rules), and 
the general loss of nerve (not only within the public, but along the entire chain of command). 
It is only by inspiring confidence that we can get through the ordeal, renew our energy, and 
come up with innovative plans and concrete roads to success. 
Here too, conventional systems are geared the wrong way. Audits tend to show leniency 
toward fiascos resulting from a strict application of the rules, but will severely condemn 
failure incurred through unconventional responses. It often proves less risky to fail by the rule 
than to succeed through unconventional tracks.  
The major challenge today is to choose and then prepare leaders so that the creative 
approach will prevail in the inevitable non-conventional crisis, whereas the entire 
organizational, administrative and institutional culture normally seeks to fall into procedural 
thinking (Young, 2007). In our cultures and in our selection processes, creative thinking is 
both punishing and punished.  And this fundamental logic is not going to be turned around by 
devoting a few hours a year to formatted “crisis management" seminars – essentially oriented 
towards the teaching of the “good answers” and “best and certified practical answers”.  
Yet the challenge cannot be merely individually focused. If these fundamentals were 
changed, we would certainly be in a better position to build institutions less opposed to 
creative leaders.  
 
Generating strategic intelligence: “Rapid Reflection Forces” 
“People in government are overwhelmed by crises […]. They do not have much time to step 
back and consider the big picture” (Hamilton, 2006, p. 12). The same is true in the private 
sector. Yet, the importance of standing back and assessing the situation objectively is even 
more important in this world of discontinuity than it is in specific limited crises. The reason is 
clear enough: because the strategic landscape has mutated, the conventional tactics and 
interpretations no longer work and are even counterproductive.  We must tear ourselves away 
from them, which demands a very active and determined effort, and then construct new 
frameworks for understanding and coping with reality.  
In operational terms, this means that leaders must have at hand people who are familiar 
with engaging chaos and who are given to thinking openly in unreadable situations.  This is 
essential for overcoming the most severely pathological reactions to these new forms of crisis. 
These are: mental blocks (the constant refrain is "in a crisis, you don’t have time to think"), 
the "bunker mentality", with everyone holing up in his own little corner; treating problems in 
purely technical ways and above all, rushing blindly to the most counterproductive options. 
The concept and practice of Rapid Reflection Force – RFF– has been forged to try to avoid 
these traps. It has been implemented for example in EDF (Electricité de France, the premier 
French public utility in the energy sector, and the first worldwide nuclear operator). Along 
with the more "tactical" crisis teams, focused entirely on immediate operational responses, 
plans and logistics, such RRF teams promptly undertake four broad lines of questioning: 
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• What is the essence of the problem? The intelligence front involves a constant battle to 
frame, anticipate, detect and clarify the nature of the crisis, surprises, domino effects, 
escalation dynamics, and the general mutations that can be triggered. By definition, it 
is not possible to grasp all the essential issues at stake in a crisis that is new, unclear 
and chaotic.i  
• What are the major pitfalls?  When the pressure of events becomes extreme, when 
panic spreads, when the bearings are lost, the very normal tendency is to become 
mired in the most counterproductive ruts. This happens with every major crisis.  It is 
crucial, immediately, to think about the major errors to avoid. And the first error is a 
wrong framing of the issue.  
• What is the map of actors; what networks are needed?  By definition, extreme crises 
strike at the system in ways that are hard to anticipate, and that may differ depending 
on the people concerned – Katrina and heat waves (Klinenberg, 2002) being set 
examples.  At the same time, the new issues will have to be handled with new players.  
New maps will be needed both for diagnosis and for action, and they will have to be 
adjusted or remodeled throughout the ordeal. 
• What constructive initiatives can the RFF propose?  The most important thing is not 
to pore over statistical lists or to compile all the information possible, but rather to try 
to discern one or a few critical initiatives that could introduce "a new ballgame", help 
us escape our crisis-induced mental ruts, and launch virtuous circles. 
 
The kind of thinking that is needed here is the diametric opposite of procedural thinking.  
We must discriminate the essential factors, both in order to understand the crisis and to get out 
of it.  In taking advantage of Rapid Reflection Forces, what is important is not to draw up lists 
of data and fill out a series of pre-formatted tables, or to get tied up in hours of 
teleconferencing that will be increasingly technical and focus on ever more detailed 
micromanagement. Experience shows that these Rapid Reflection Forces are crucial for 
Executives Committees, from blowing the whistle (“there is a crisis, do wake up”), to re-
checking the organizational response, and above all to delineate some creative initiative to 
transform the global dynamics (Béroux, Lagadec, Guilhou, 2007, 2008). 
After two years of implementation, the quintessential power of the Rapid Reflection Force 
innovation is coming to the fore. Fundamentally, the RRF is not just another organizational 
tool providing additional answers. The RRF manifests the necessity of an open-minded, 
questioning, creative stance, beyond the usual mere applications of previous models and 
mindsets.   
 
Empowerment 
The years 1980-2000 were dominated by the idea of "Communication".  We were told that, to 
manage crises, we had to give information to the public, as a democratic requirement.  That in 
itself represented an important step forward.  The traditional response in times of emergency 
or catastrophe has been one of “Command and Control”. This is based on two sturdy pillars: 
the concentration of decision-making in a cloistered hierarchical structure, and the restriction 
of information held by that structure, in keeping with the military principles of the past. 
It was finally admitted that the key to success in multidimensional turbulences required 
other approaches.  It called for bringing coherence to a great number of entities, and such 
dynamics could not be achieved with an approach to governance that was restrictive, vertical, 
compartmentalized, and designed to minimize information. 
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We must now go much further. It is essential to provide critical information to those who 
will have to cope with abnormal situations on their own for some time. They must be brought 
decisively within the strategic loop; plans must be widely discussed with them, and their 
creativity and their initiative must be sought as inputs. Today’s environment demands 
dynamic linkages, fluidity and speed, shared information, and collective confidence.  
Such an avenue certainly can seem complex, even shockingly so.  “When things are serious, 
you command, you do not consult”. But public bodies are not the only one on the front line: 
“The ‘first’ responders on 9/11, as in most catastrophes, were private civilians. Because 85 
percent of our nation’s critical infrastructure is controlled not by government but by the 
private sector, private-sector civilians are likely to be the first responders in any future 
catastrophe” (National Commission, 2003, p. 317). 
And this way is even more vital, not less, when extreme events are the challenge. This is a 
key lesson of 9/11: The point was not to hide information from the public to avoid panic, but 
to give as much information as possible to the public, to help save lives. “Firemen were 
impressed with the composure and total lack of panic shown by almost all civilians” (National 
Commission, 2004, p. 299). In fact, a careful analysis of the 9/11 Commission’s or other key 
reports, from the inside (Dwyer and Flynn, 2006), show that one of the most vital strategies 
was not to “Reassure” and “Command”, but to Inform and Combine. Some found a way down 
in the towers; the crucial issue was to obtain this information, and share it as broadly as 
possible. Therefore, 9/11 had to switch from a top-down system to a bottom-to-bottom 
dissemination of vital pieces of information.  
This was the same seminal lesson of the 1918-Pandemic: “The fear, not the disease, 
threatened to break the society apart” (Barry, 2006, p. 461). Abraham Lincoln, quoted by 
Barry’s as the final words of his book, clarifies the ultimate issue: “Those in authority must 
retain the public’s trust. The way to do it is to distort nothing, to put the best face on nothing, 
to try to manipulate no one. Lincoln said that first, and best. Leadership must make whatever 
horror exists concrete. Only then will people be able to break it apart” (Barry, 2006, p. 461). 
 
Crisis recovery: embedding the recovery issue upstream 
Until very recently, experts divided a crisis into successive and clearly defined phases: the 
pre-crisis (the prevention and surveillance phase), the crisis itself (the acute phase of response 
and mitigation), and the post-crisis phase (reconstruction or recovery).  This last phase came 
"afterward" not only in the chronological sense, but also in the setting of priorities. 
The recovery dimension was deemed less important, because prevention, which was easier 
in a more stable and predictable world, would reduce the incidence of crises. When 
prevention failed, the crisis would be "managed", and any "residual" problems could be left to 
the last phase.   
Today, this scheme has been profoundly disrupted. The reconstruction of New Orleans 
after Katrina will be a decade-long affair. Crisis recovery  must be addressed as soon as crisis 
management begins, and even in preparedness efforts (for example in the architecture of 
information and communication systems). Unless the conditions of system recovery in a 
major crisis are carefully considered far in advance, the obstacles may well become 
insurmountable during the reconstruction phase that will have to be mounted after a severe 
event. The vision of a “back to normal” situation is just beside the point, there is no such thing 
in a chaotic context. 
 
Education and Research 
Until these issues are covered during initial education of prospective institutional leaders it 
will be very difficult to insert them on the agenda for decision-makers. Because the subject is 
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so foreign to their frame of reference, they will be too fearful of the risks to consider and 
construct creative solutions.  The real question, though, is this: how must we equip our future 
managers and citizens so that they can find new bearings, new anchor points for conviction, 
new tools of action in a world fraught with crisis and discontinuity?  (Frémont, 2004; Taleb, 
2007). This must not be done in a stable world where the disruptions to be “managed” are rare 
and isolated, but where discontinuity and mutation become the very matrix of evolution. Our 
responsibility – as ever – is to create systems of education and research that “could produce 
people capable of thinking in a new way” (Barry, 2004, p. 5). Urgency is of the essence: it 
would be foolish to educate the next generation of leaders to managing last century 
emergencies.  
 
 
Conclusion 
It is urgent to consider the very risks of our risk analysis and crisis management culture –
 which are currently tending to become veritable bridgeheads of the emerging crises 
themselves. A striking quote attributed to Bismarck could serve today as a global warning: 
“As long as the War College is in Paris, Germany will be fine”.  Fighting the crises of last 
century is a monumental mistake, the mother of many collective failures.  
The essence of the watershed we have undergone has to be accepted and dealt with, even if 
it precipitates deep mourning for past paradigms. Emerging crises have quit the realm of 
“emergency” – known problems, ready-made answers, fast responses – that has been the 
cradle of crisis research and practice. Crisis thinking now has to break out of this 
“emergency” rut.  
Crisis is becoming the core dynamics, the biological texture, the very identity of an 
unknown world, whose laws combine extremes, ignorance, discontinuity and chaotic 
turbulence.  The name of the game is not the fixed, reassuring and successful answers, but the 
intellectual, psychological and leadership capacity to open the questions and draw new maps 
for sailing such unknown territories, with their “rude surprises” (LaPorte, 2007b), their Cape 
Horns, their rogue waves, and their spongiform environments  
On all fronts, intellectual, managerial, governance, belief, we must now acquire the skills 
and the openness to address the new vulnerability issues.  We must venture resolutely into 
these new frontiers, in order to understand them and to improve our skills, in terms of vision, 
strategies and tools - to better master our destiny in these particularly turbulent times.  
Some could still argue that such “out-of-the-box problems” are not “scientific problems”, 
or “governance issues”. We do know, after Thomas Kuhn (1962) that science is not 
particularly interested in changing paradigms, and much prefers to simply improve 
understanding and know-how in the dominant paradigm. Yet, we must understand that the 
global conditions do not give us such luxury. When issues are that vital, science cannot 
barricade itself into its well known regions. This represents a real challenge, and a revolution, 
but there is no choice. Similarly, some could argue that institutions are not made for stormy 
environments: they even tend to prefer the pursuit of a policy contrary to self-interest than to 
invent new ways (Tuchman, 1984). Such a line of defense could be disastrous. If institutions 
continually seek out the comfort of “normal contexts” they will rapidly restrain their function 
to a kind of museum-like activity.  
The specifics of the challenge are new; but the fundamentals are not. Abraham Lincoln’s 
words resonate as a solid blueprint for today: “The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate for 
the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with uncertainty, and we must rise to the 
occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew” (Lincoln, 1861). The 21st 
Century appears more turbulent than we could ever have imagined, due to the global ripple 
effect of every local dysfunction, and the core mutation of systemic equilibriums. 
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Contemporary Magellans will need a great deal of intelligence, courage and determination. 
But failure is not an option.  
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Notes 
1 Margaret Hermann, analyzing 9/11at the LSU conference on future disasters (Baton Rouge, 
April 2008) underlined the crucial importance of the very initial framing of the problem at the 
outset of a crisis: “Within an hour Tony Blair was on TV and said: ‘This is a crime against 
civilization’. Later he talked about it being a matter for the police, legal system, and rule of 
law.  Justice was the focus of his framing. A week later, I came back to the US and 9/11 had 
been framed as an attack against America. Which means it is military, it’s war, and it’s 
nationalism. Ladies and Gentlemen, it’s the same event defined and framed in a very different 
ways. The options you are being given are very limited by this frame and one of the 
difficulties between Europe and the USA in dealing with terrorism has been based in that 
framing of 9/11”. 
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